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Death Penalty and Mental Illness:
The Challenge of Reconciling Human Rights,
Criminal Law, and Psychiatric Standards
Liliana Lyra Jubilut1
I remind myself that many of the mistakes in mental health care
come from a helping attitude. But they want to help without
asking you, without understanding you, without involving you,
“in your best interest.”2

INTRODUCTION
Over the years, gains made under international human rights law have
resulted in an expanding realm of people protected by its norms. Early
efforts focused on the assurance of individual rights and evolved to
encompass “traditional and visible minorities”; more recently, efforts are
focused on addressing concerns about “invisible, underprotected
minorities,” including people with disabilities in general and people who
suffer from mental disorders3—especially mental disabilities and mental
illness4—in particular.5 Focus on this last group is due to the fact that
“[f]rom a human rights perspective, the intellectually disabled rank among
the world’s most vulnerable and at-risk populations, both because they are
different and because their disability renders them less able either to assert
their rights or to protect themselves against blatant discrimination.”6
The focus of the protection has been to establish that people who suffer
from mental disorders, being “different but equal”7 in dignity and rights, are
entitled to all human rights “simply because of their humanity.”8 Thus far,
most of the battles have been attempts to ensure that the people who suffer
from mental disorders have equal opportunities and are protected while in
treatment and confinement.9 Recently, the scope of protection sought has
expanded to include an attempt to carve out an exemption from the death
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penalty for people who suffer from mental disorders. This article examines
those efforts in the United States through the lens of international human
rights law.
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia10
exempted people who suffer from mental retardation from the death
penalty. Following this decision, Amnesty International (AI)11 and the
American Bar Association (ABA)12 began independent efforts to advocate
for the extension of this exemption to people who suffer from mental
illness.13 These initiatives are valuable because they bring to light an
important topic and initiate debate on the issue. Unfortunately, however,
both proposals fall short of advocating for comprehensive protection for the
human dignity of people who suffer from mental illness14 in legal systems
that retain capital punishment. In this article, the limitations of the ABA
and AI proposals will be addressed so as to highlight the main problems that
arise in attemtping to provide the most effective protection from the death
penalty to people who suffer from mental illness.
The proposals are inadequate in two ways. First, because the issue of
mental health and the death penalty involves the convergence of medicine
and law, providing protection from capital punishment to people who suffer
from mental illness will only be feasible through an interdisciplinary
approach that encompasses human rights, criminal law, and psychiatry. In
both the AI and ABA proposals, such collaboration exists only
superficially.
Second, in addressing the issue of capital punishment and mental illness,
one can emphasize one of two approaches: abolishing the death penalty
altogether or protecting the people who suffer from mental illness while
maintaining the dealth penalty in general. The resulting proposals depend
on which approach is chosen. Both the ABA and the AI proposals focus on
an abolitionist position, with the protection of people who suffer from
mental illness playing a supporting role. Although this focus is consistent
with both organizations’ goals to limit the scope of the use of capital
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punishment,15 this article argues that in relation to the death penalty and
mental illness in the United States, the proposals are ultimately too limited
to effectively exempt people who suffer from mental illness from capital
punishment.
In light of the complexities of focus and approach, this article aims to
highlight the most relevant problems that arise from the current attempts to
exempt people who suffer from mental illness from the death penalty and is
an effort to stimulate discussions to the end of enhancing effective
protection. Part I will address two background issues: whether new
standards are needed, and whether law and psychiatry are compatible
enough to allow for an interdisciplinary approach. Part II of the article will
briefly highlight the main aspects of the ABA’s and AI’s proposals. Part III
will analyze the shortcomings of the existing proposals, focusing on the use
of a categorical and a time-framed approach. Finally, Part IV proposes
alternate paths to more effectively protect people who suffer from mental
illness—focusing on due process and fair resolution as well as improving
access to medical care.

I. BACKGROUND ISSUES IN ASSESSING THE PROPOSALS
Two background issues need to be addressed before examining the
positive and negative aspects of the ABA and AI proposals. First, given
that there are already safeguards built into criminal legal systems—
particularly in the United States—such as rules regarding competence and
the plea of insanity, this section will explore whether a need exists for a new
set of protective rules.16 Second, this section will examine whether an
interdisciplinary approach is feasible.
A. The Need for New Safeguards
In criminal law in the United States there are three avenues of protection
for the “insane.” First, it is possible to present claims of insanity or lack of
competency in several phases of trial. Second, in the sentencing phase of a
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capital trial, the defense can introduce evidence of mental disorder as a
mitigating factor. Finally, after sentencing, the argument can be made that
the defendant belongs to one of the categories exempt from the death
penalty. After the resumption of the death penalty in the United States in
the wake of the 1976 Supreme Court decision in Gregg v. Georgia,17
exemptions from capital punishment have been granted to the “insane”
(Ford v. Wainwright),18 to children (Roper v. Simmons),19 and to the
mentally retarded (Atkins v. Virginia).20
In practice, however, these guarantees are insufficient.21 Although Ford
v. Wainwright established an exemption for the “insane,” it did not establish
a specific definition of competence, of insanity, or of the procedures to
determine these two concepts.22 Besides, as the AI report makes clear,
despite these legal protections, several people with obvious mental
disorders have been sentenced and put to death in the United States23—
calling into question the effectiveness of the existing protection.24
Specifically, the lack of a constitutionally protected full competency
hearing on supervening insanity25 and differences in lexical usages between
the legal and medical fields demonstrate the inadequacies of the current
system.
In addition to the problems raised by the lack of a constitutionally
protected competency hearing, the difficulty posed by interdisciplinary
communication also hampers the effort to protect people who suffer from
mental illness from the death penalty. As a result of lexical usage,
communication about mental health between law and medicine is difficult.
While the concepts of insanity and competence are legal rather than
medical, the concept of suffering from mental illness is medical. As a
result, conflicting approaches to assessing mental illness arise between the
medical and legal experts.
For instance, it is common in the classification of mental disorders to use
adjectives such as mild or severe to determine the level of the existing
disease. From a psychiatric perspective, the inclusion of such adjectives
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comes after the determination that the disease exists; the adjective serves to
qualify it. On the other hand, for a person outside the medical profession,
the inclusion of the words mild or severe may be the decisive factor in the
perception of the existence of the disease itself and not merely a qualifying
factor. Such modifiers have also led to the perception that mild diminished
capacity may still be enough capacity to be executed.
Currently, the threshold for mental disease used in legal procedures
seems to be higher than those used in medicine; only severe mental
disorders are perceived as diseases from a legal perspective, whereas from a
medical standpoint, even mild disorders are diseases. Given that this
assessment will lead to the establishment of whether or not the person is
“insane” and/or competent, this difference is extremely relevant. Yet, as a
result of the difference in lexical usage, sometimes very little weight is
given to the psychiatrist’s expert opinion about the condition of the
defendant in relation to his or her mental status because the court’s focus is
on legal thresholds rather than on the medical condition.
Another example of communication difficulties related to lexical usage is
the fact that juries not only tend to misunderstand the meaning of the word
mitigating, but also tend to attribute to it the opposite meaning,
understanding the word to mean aggravating and believing the existence of
mental illness contributes to a “greater likelihood of being dangerous in the
future.”26
Given the above, even if current legal safeguards covered all grounds of
legal and psychiatric concepts of insanity, they would still fail to adequately
protect people who suffer from mental illnesses and/or diseases from the
death penalty.
B. A Closer Dialogue Between Law and Psychiatry
The second background issue is whether an effective collaboration
between law and psychiatry, the foundation of an interdisciplinary approach
to the issue of the death penalty and mental illness, is possible. There are

VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 1 • 2007

358 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

two likely barriers to such collaboration. First, as a general principle, the
legal field is hesitant to rely on other fields of knowledge. Second, there is
the question as to whether law and psychiatry are compatible.
Although legal arguments carry the most weight in legal analysis, law is
incomplete by itself. Thus, there needs to be space for arguments based on
other types of knowledge such as economics, social science, and political
science, as well as expertise in technical areas such as the use of DNA in
paternity tests and the assessment of environmental damages. While
specialized testimony and opinions may be allowed, the legal system
remains unreceptive to some sciences.27 This lack of receptiveness28 often
results in expert testimony of nonlegal experts being disregarded. This is
true in the case of psychiatrists’ opinions in relation to people who suffer
from mental illness.
Even though it seems logical that medical professionals are in a better
position to ascertain the mental health of a defendant, the law allows the
legal actors (such as judges and jurors) a vast level of discretion by not
requiring that they follow the experts’ conclusions. Courts, thus, tend to use
expert data as they see fit, misapplying or misusing data when they believe
the data will enhance the persuasiveness of their opinions, ignoring or
rejecting data despite its dependence on empirically testable statements in
support of its holdings, and disparaging data when the research does not
support their views.29 An example of this practice is the rejection by the
Supreme Court of social psychology studies and empirical research in
Lockhart v. McCree in 1986.30
Thus, courts sometimes accept the influence of other fields so long as this
influence is filtered by the law itself. This feature is important for the
analysis of the issue at stake here insofar as no matter how logical or
convincing a psychiatric argument is, one will always need to find legal
arguments to support it.
As to whether law and psychiatry are compatible, it has been argued that
because law and medicine have opposing methods and aims, collaboration

DEATH PENALTY

Death Penalty and Mental Illness 359

will be difficult. For example, while law uses an adversarial methodology,
medicine uses a cooperative one31—a difference that could lead to very
different outcomes. As to goals:
[s]ometimes the aims of medicine and law may be perceived as
conflicting. This may occur insofar as law may be viewed as
concentrating on rights whereas medicine may be seen as
concentrating on needs. Similarly, law functions primarily to
recompense or avoid harm while the primary aim of medicine is
directed towards conferring benefits.32
While these incompatibilities may exist within a classic and formalist
concept of law, if one adds to the relationship an international human rights
legal perspective, those incompatibilities become surmountable. The aim of
international human rights law is to protect the individual and assure his or
her fundamental rights while focusing on needs, avoiding harm, and
conferring benefits. International human rights law, therefore, combines the
aims of medicine (conferring benefits) and of traditional concepts of law
(recompensing or avoiding harm). In addition, international human rights
law employs a more cooperative rather than adversarial methodology, for
the main value to be protected is human dignity.33 This approach implies
that the most protective standards possible should be chosen and that an
interest (even an obligation) by states to find the ideal solution to each case
should exist. From this perspective, the burden of assessing the existence of
mental illness would be shared between the state and the individual, as it
would be in the interest of both to ensure that the right conclusion is
reached.34
Thus, in addressing the protection of people who suffer from mental
illness from the death penalty, when the perspective and principles of
international human rights law are brought to bear, law and psychiatry are
not only compatible but are also complementary.35 For instance, the
American Psychiatric Association guidelines address both human rights
issues such as interrogation of detainees36 and the death penalty,37 but they
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also assert that human rights and human dignity are to be observed in the
conduct of psychiatrists.38
One can say that law and psychiatry can work together and also that, in
the issue of the death penalty and mental illness, they must do so if the
peculiarities involved are to be taken into consideration in an attempt to
provide the most protective system possible.

II. THE ABA’S AND AI’S PROPOSALS
In the wake of Atkins v. Virginia,39 which established an exemption to the
death penalty for the mentally retarded, the ABA and AI began, as
previously mentioned, to advocate a similar exemption for people who
suffer from mental illness. Given that the “insane” exemption did not
protect people who suffer from mental disorders from the death penalty, the
proposal focuses on the concept of diminished culpability to exempt people
with mental retardation from the death penalty and, to a lesser extent, on the
lack of humanity in killing sick people40 to advance a similar exemption to
people who suffer from mental illness.
The idea of using limitations as a way to progressively achieve the goal
of abolition is, in fact, a common trend around the world. This goal is
carried out either through the existence of moratoria in the application of
death sentences, or through a variety of exemptions including limitations on
both what crimes41 and which people42 are subject to the death penalty and
what methods of imposition are acceptable.43 The movement in the United
States to exempt people who suffer from mental illness from the death
penalty is a clear example of the desire to establish a categorical limitation
for a particular group of people.
AI published a report on January 31, 2006, on the issue of mental illness
and the death penalty.44 Consistent with the organization’s general practice,
the report relies on the persuasive power of practical examples; it narrates
several cases of people in the United States who suffer from mental illness
and who either were executed or are on the death row as a way to
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demonstrate that the system is failing and that action needs to be taken to
remedy the situation.
According to the report, its aims are twofold. On the one hand, it shows
that people who suffer from mental illness continue to be executed, and
thus, that the existing safeguards are not enough.45 On the other hand, it
demonstrates that there is no reason why mental illness and mental
retardation should be treated differently in relation to an exemption from the
death penalty.46 The report also states that establishing which individuals
should be exempt from capital punishment due to the existence of a mental
illness at the time of the crime is not one of its goals.47
The shortcomings of the report exist both in relation to the internal
consistency of the report and to the adequacy of the report in addressing
mental illness and the death penalty. In relation to the internal consistency,
there are two problems. First, although the report acknowledges the
difference between mental retardation and mental illness, it tries to
analogize these two mental disorders. This is inconsistent and has the
potential to backfire once the important differences in these concepts arise.
Mental disorder is the broad term encompassing all mental diseases.48
Within the general concept of mental disorders, there are two axes of
diseases.49 The first encompasses the so-called process disorders and the
second the so-called development disorders. Process disorders, generally
called mental illnesses, exist when the illness is a result of an event that
changes the behavior of the individual. Mental illness causes episodes of
the disease rather than a continuous state of being mentally ill; accordingly,
there could be periods where the disease exists but is dormant. On the other
hand, a development disorder exists when the illness is inherent to the
person and does not appear in episodes but rather can be permanently
verified. This is the case of people suffering from mental retardation,50 for
instance.51
In light of these differences, the use of the same approach for two
different situations is problematic, especially given that the perception and
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diagnosis of mental retardation is much more constant than one of mental
illness, as will be seen in Part III of this article.
Second, although the AI report says that it does not occupy itself with
people who suffer from mental illness at the time of the crime, several
examples in the report include people in this category; thus it uses examples
that do not support its thesis or recommendations. Moreover, if the idea is
to carve out an exemption from the death penalty for people who suffer
from mental illness, determining who is encompassed by such an
exemption, notwithstanding its difficulty, is an issue that cannot be avoided.
In relation to the adequacy of the mental illness topic, there are several
issues—such as the use of a categorical approach and a time-framed
evaluation of mental illness—that, as will be seen later in this article, are
not as developed as they should be, which may lead to suboptimal solutions.
The problem of adequacy seems related to the lack of a deep
interdisciplinary approach to the topic. Adding to this is the problem of
giving more weight to advancing the abolition of the death penalty than to
trying to ensure the most protective system possible for people who suffer
from mental illness within the existing retentionist framework.
The deficiency of this approach is exemplified in the main solution
proposed by the AI report. AI calls for both the respect of the United
Nations Principles for the Protection of People with Mental Illness and the
Improvement of Mental Health Care52 and other measures.53 Its main focus,
however, is on the need for a norm—either through a Supreme Court
decision or legislation—that categorically exempts people who suffer from
mental illness from the death penalty. As will be seen in the following
sections, this solution is inadequate given that people with mental illness are
still being executed despite the exception for the “insane.”
The ABA created the Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death
Penalty within its Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, which
proposed three recommendations regarding people with mental retardation
or dementia and mental disorder or disability.54 Although also focusing on
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a categorical exemption, the ABA proposal is more detailed than the one
presented by AI because it includes criteria to limit the application of the
exemption in practice.55 The ABA proposal also has the advantage56 of
having been accepted by the American Psychiatric Association;57 in
addition, the American Psychological Association is currently analyzing the
proposal and will likely endorse it.58 These acceptances add legitimacy to
the debate; on the other hand, they may lead to the false conclusion that the
ABA proposes an interdisciplinary approach that is sufficient to adequately
deal with the issue of the death penalty and mental illness.
Another issue is the significantly different language adopted by the ABA
and the American Psychiatric Association. The American Psychiatric
Association’s proposal does not use a time-framed concept, as it does not
mention the existence of a mental illness at the time of the offense; it does
not mention a severe mental illness, but only mental illness; it uses the
broader idea of a fair resolution of the case, rather than focusing on more
limited legal concepts; and it clarifies that for a person to be mentally
competent, he or she has to both be aware of and appreciate the nature of
the punishment. Such differences make the conclusion that the ABA
proposal brings a sufficient interdisciplinary approach unfounded.
Both the ABA and AI should be commended for trying to limit the use of
capital punishment and for bringing to the public’s attention the lack of
effective protection of people who suffer from mental illness from the death
penalty. Nevertheless, the current proposals are insufficient to ensure
effective protection.

III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PROPOSALS
Both the AI and ABA proposals demonstrate that the current system is
not always effective in protecting people who suffer from mental illness
from the death penalty; therefore, new standards are justified. Because
these proposals do not take an interdisciplinary approach, their
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recommended solutions will not sufficiently enhance protections to ensure
that people with mental illness are not executed.
This part will examine the shortcomings of the two proposals. It will
begin with an evaluation of the core idea of the proposals: the use of the
categorical approach in advocating an exemption from the death penalty for
people who suffer from mental illness. Next, it will examine the timeframed approach, which provides protection for people who suffer from
mental illness at the time of the crime, at the time of the trial, and at the
time of execution.
A. The Use of a Categorical Approach
The core idea of the proposals is to advance a categorical approach to
exempt people who suffer from mental illness. This categorical approach
builds on international law and practice as abolition of the death penalty is
increasingly59 advocated in international law,60 and the right to life61 is
already a part of the core of international human rights law. Although these
efforts could lead to outlawing capital punishment, it is not currently
prohibited.62
The different international law approaches to the death penalty are
reflected by two sets of international law documents. Some international
documents such as the Second Additional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) advocate total abolition of
capital punishment; states that ratify the Second Additional Protocol to the
ICCPR63 commit to abolishing the death penalty.64
However, other international documents, while supporting the
aspirational character of this goal—total abolition of capital punishment65—
only go so far as to impose categorical limitations on the death penalty.
This approach is reflected by both Article 6 of the ICCPR and the United
Nations Safeguards that guarantee protection of the rights of those facing
the death penalty.66 Article 6 of the ICCPR, for example, states that the
death penalty cannot be imposed on people under eighteen years of age or
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pregnant women; it can only be imposed for the most serious crimes, after a
final judgment by a competent court, and without retroactive application of
law.67 Article 6 thus utilizes categories or closed classes of people that are
exempted from capital punishment.
Additionally, in 1984, nine UN Safeguards were adopted by the
Economic and Social Council68 and embraced by the General Assembly.69
Among other goals, the UN Safeguards aim to “exempt those under 18
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, pregnant women,
new mothers and those who are or have become ‘insane.’”70
Protection of the “insane” is ensured by the 1989 revision of Safeguard 3,
which also led to the inclusion of the aged as a category of people exempted
from capital punishment.71 Although the original text only exempted from
the death penalty people who had become “insane,” the revision expanded
this exemption to include people “suffering from mental retardation or
extremely limited mental competence, whether at the sentencing stage or at
execution.”72
Even though the UN safeguards are not legally binding, they are relevant
because they set a trend towards categorical exemptions for children,
pregnant women, new mothers, and the “insane.” Exemptions such as these
have been adopted in isolation or in groups by some countries and have
inspired national movement, which advocate gradual limitations of the
death penalty by focusing on increasing categorical exemptions. The AI
and ABA proposals adopt this approach.73 Although the categorical
approach may be effective in limiting the death penalty for certain groups,
in relation to people who suffer from mental illness, the feasibility of such a
path is questionable for several reasons, which are explored below.
1. Mental Illness as the Identification Factor of a Distinguishable
Group
The first challenge in using a categorical approach in creating a mental
illness exception to the death penalty is that defining mental illness as the
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aggregate factor of an identifiable group may be a complex (and possibly
insurmountable) task.
All the other categories in which exemptions to the death penalty have
been carved out—namely pregnant women, new mothers, children, aged
people, and the mentally retarded—are categories whose definitions and
determination are easier because, to some extent, they form closed classes.
It is not difficult to determine whether a woman is pregnant or has recently
had a baby, or whether a person is under the age of eighteen or over a
certain age. Although there are some controversies about assessing whether
a person suffers from mental retardation, the general concept of mental
retardation is not problematic.74
However, when it comes to mental illness, defining a closed class
presents many challenges. First, mental illness involves the complexity of
the human mind, which is far from totally understood, and scientific
definitions are not fixed and exact but rather evolving and mutable.75
Second, diagnoses and prognoses of mental disorders vary historically76
based on changing social perceptions77 and on new medical discoveries;
what is perceived as a mental disorder today may not be in a few years and
vice versa.78 Third, because the diagnoses of mental disorders are not made
in a vacuum but by a human prone to cultural bias, the diagnoses may be
biased as well.79 This means that what may be perceived as a mental
disorder in one culture may be perceived as a common social practice or
reaction in another.80 In this sense, diagnoses of mental disorders are
historically and culturally constructed81 concepts.82 Therefore, they are not
easily standardized to enable a categorical definition of people who suffer
from mental illness.
Exemplyifing the difficulty in establishing a categorical definition are the
two equally credible classification tools currently being applied in relation
to mental disorders:83 the International Classification of Diseases (ICD)
created by the World Health Organization84 and the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) published by the
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American Psychiatric Association.85 This duplicity shows that there is no
universal standard for classification of mental disorders; even among the
expert community, there is no consensus on standards for classification.
Such duplicity presents a serious challenge in creating a categorical
exemption based on a closed class of mental illness.
2. The Broad Range of Diseases that Are Mental Illnesses
Furthermore, the mental illnesses that are grouped together in both the
ICD and the DSM-IV are diverse diseases ranging from schizophrenia and
personality disorders to anorexia and sleep disorders.86 This vast variety of
diseases may be a factor in creating opposition to the adoption of a
categorical exemption due to the sheer numbers of individuals with these
conditions.
Given that psychiatry is an evolving and flexible science, and that
diagnosis of mental illness is culturally and socially constructed, it is not
surprising that there are competing statistics on the prevalence of mental
illness. The more conservative studies find that up to 10 percent of inmates
on death row suffer from serious mental illness.87 However, other studies
suggest that the proportion of prisoners on death row who have been treated
for some kind of psychiatric disorder can be as high as one-third.88 This
wide range of percentages reflects the ranges of the total general population;
comprehensive studies suggest that “32% of the population have or have
had a psychiatric disorder (lifetime prevalence), . . . that 20% had an active
disorder (meaning that they had met criteria for a disorder at some time in
the person’s life and had at least one symptom in the year prior to the
interview),”89 and that “48% of the population ha[d] at least one psychiatric
disorder at some time in their life and 29% in the past year.”90
In view of these high percentages, having a categorical approach might
be problematic for two additional reasons. First, from the point of view of
criminal law, because a large percentage of the inmates on death row would
be exempted by the adoption of this standard, it would create a de facto
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abolition of the death penalty, which is not currently feasible within the
United States’ retentionist framework. This is especially true if one takes
into consideration that mental illness diagnoses91 and death sentences 92 are
higher among African Americans, who currently represent 42 percent of the
population on death row.93 Thus, in light of the fact that the United States is
retentionist, the advocacy of such an abolitionist policy does not seem
feasible.
Second, even from a human rights approach, if the death penalty is
abolished and not replaced by a more humane form of punishment, the
result could be widespread impunity. This is due to the fact that the human
rights system also has to consider victims’ rights,94 which means that it is
not in favor of criminal acts going unpunished.95 Thus, a situation in which
huge numbers of crimes will go unpunished is unacceptable under
international human rights law. Obviously, other forms of punishment
could—and from a human rights perspective should—substitute the death
penalty to prevent both impunity and application of capital punishment.
3. Mental Illness and Criminal Responsibility
A third problem with adopting a categorical approach is determining
which relevant assessment criteria should be used to establish criminal
responsibility and, therefore, which groups would be exempted.
The ABA and AI proposals focus on the concept of diminished capacity
due to mental illness; they argue that such diminished capacity
demonstrates a lack of criminal responsibility and, thus, should be a basis
for an exemption from the death penalty.96 If one expects a result that is
both just and feasible, a dialogue between criminal law and psychiatry is
required in order to determine which individuals are not criminally
responsible due to dimished capacity. One solution would be to distinguish
among diseases that affect the cognitive abilities of the individual,
jeopardizing his or her capacity to understand what is right or wrong. This
qualification of the mental illness category appears in the ABA
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recommendation97 and may be more feasible in a retentionist country than a
categorical exemption for people who suffer from mental illness because it
limits the number of people that would benefit from the exemption.
However, in the same way that diagnoses of mental illnesses are fluid,
determinations of whether a mental illness impairs the ability to tell right
from wrong also may be fluid. Thus, the acceptance of a categorical
exemption, even with a qualification that limits the number of people to
which it applies, may still be too broad a norm and may not mark an
evolution from the current “insane” exemption.
The arbitrariness of drawing distinctions is exemplified by the ABA
recommendations, which suggest that “[a] disorder manifested primarily by
repeated criminal conduct or attributable solely to the acute effects of
voluntary use of alcohol or other drugs does not, standing alone, constitute a
mental disorder.”98 This assertion is problematic because, on the one hand,
there are studies that show that most people (some say 70 percent)99 who
suffer from mental illness and who are in the criminal system are not
violent,100 but rather were arrested for behavior linked to the illness.101 In
addition, other studies demonstrate that repeated criminal conduct can be
symptomatic of a disease; for example, there are four times as many people
who suffer from mental illness in prison than in hospitals on any given
day.102 On the other hand, it has been established that the use of alcohol
and drugs can lead to schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. From a
medical point of view, these disorders, once established, are as much a
disease as any other mental disorder—regardless of their original causes.103
Besides the above-mentioned problems with determining the relevant
assessment criteria to establish criminal responsibility (due to the
particularities of mental illness), there is also a general divergence between
criminal law and psychiatry about the basis of competence. Criminal law
attempts to draw the line by focusing on criminal competency, a notion that
is based on the belief of free will and conscience; given the retributive
character of punishment, when an individual commits a crime and is
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conscious of his or her act, that person can and should be punished.104
However, it has been argued by psychiatrists that this notion is inadequate
since “free will is a legal fiction.”105 “[B]ehavior is not so unfettered. It is
determined as a result of the confluence of genetic endowment and life
experiences. In that view, . . . there are no heroes and there are no
villains.”106 In adopting an interdisciplinary approach, as proposed by this
article, the divergence between the two systems could paralyze the criminal
system, as each approach to determining competency bases itself on a
different ideology. As this is not the desired outcome, one has to focus on
more nuanced, practical solutions while trying to encourage a dialogue
between criminal law and psychiatry to find common ground.
B. Time-framed Evaluations of Mental Illness
Another problematic aspect of both the existing and proposed standards
of protection is that they focus on the existence of a mental illness at the
time of the commission of the crime, sentencing, or execution. Although
these time-framed evaluations seem to protect people who suffer from
mental illness from capital punishment, in reality, they do not.
The main flaw with using a time-framed evaluation arises when a person
suffers from mental illness but the disease is not present at the time of the
commission of the crime, at sentencing, or at execution. Generally, if a
person commits a crime while mentally ill, the legal concept of insanity or
incompetence and the “insane” exemption will be sufficient to protect
against a death sentence because his or her mental capacity will be deemed
diminished. The same is true if a person becomes mentally ill either after
being sentenced or at the time of execution. Such a development is
possibile according to the etiology of mental disorders; mental disorders can
be a result of genetically inherited trends or can result from external factors
such as brain damage or traumatic experiences such as the tension of living
on death row.107 On the other hand, if a person is not mentally ill at the
specific times established by the law, he or she will receive no protection

DEATH PENALTY

Death Penalty and Mental Illness 371

whatsoever from capital punishment. This situation is possible because
mental illness is considered a process disorder rather than a development
disorder, which means the illness may not be in place at a specific time but
may exist and impair the person’s cognitive skills nonetheless.
Given that mental illness is a process disorder, trying to capture the
existence of the disease in specific time frames may lead to the conclusion
that the disease does not exist when, in fact, the person is simply not having
an episode at that time. If the court accepts that reasoning, then it will
assume that the person has the competence to understand the reasons and
consequences of his or her act and, therefore, could deem the defendant
legally competent and subject to capital punishment.
Another troubling factor is that some mental illnesses have sequelas,
which means that although the person is not having an episode at a given
time, his or her competence and conscience level is still diminished.108 This
could be a case of approximation of a process disorder and a development
disorder in which the person has a permanent lower level of reasoning even
though the disease does not seem to be present. Sequelas are significant in
light of the notion of free will and conscience as the basis of criminal
responsibility.
Currently, the criterion used in the United States to determine whether a
person is “insane” is one of awareness. According to the threshold
established in Ford v. Wainwright, as long as the person is aware of what is
going to happen to him or her (i.e., execution) and why (i.e., because of the
commission of a crime), the person is considered sufficiently competent to
be executed.109
The practical problem that arises from the current “insanity” definition is
the notion that a person who suffers from a mental illness can be forcibly
treated and restored to competence, which would ultimately lead to his or
her execution. This presents the alarming prospect of “healing” a mentally
ill person solely to execute him or her. Another aspect of this situation is
the possibility that this restored conscience is likely only due to the
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administration of medicines and is not a real cure. Were the medicines to
be withdrawn, the person would once again be considered “insane” and
therefore not subject to execution.
Although a situation where one might be “cured” solely to be executed is
legally permitted, if approached from a medical perspective, the same
situation would not be permissible. Medical treatment considers the best
interest of the patient; the restoration to competency in order to execute
would contravene medical goals—it would not be in the best interest of
anyone to be treated in order to be executed. An interdisciplinary approach
to mental illness and capital punishment would avoid this appalling
situation because the existence of the disease at any time would result in
exemption from capital punishment.
Therefore, the time-framed evaluation of mental illness has a fatal flaw.
This flaw arises when a person suffers from a mental illness but the disease
is not in place at the time of the commission of the crime, sentencing, or
execution. If this approach is retained, many people who suffer from
mental illness will be executed.

IV. ALTERNATE PATHS
Based on the foregoing, focusing on preexistent abolitionist tactics will
not increase protection from the death penalty for people who suffer from
mental illness. Thus, a change of focus is necessary. The focus should be
on protecting people who suffer from mental illness rather than on
abolishing the death penalty. This focus better provides intervention
alternatives that ensure effective protection from capital punishment. The
following sections of this article explore two of these interventions: (1) due
process and fair resolution, and (2) improving access to medical care.
A. Focusing on Due Process and Fair Resolution
This section will discuss how traditional due process protections are often
functionally lacking in cases involving mental illnesses.110 Although both
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the ABA’s and AI’s proposals lack emphasis on the procedural aspects
involved in a capital case, focusing on enhancing procedural guarantees to
ensure adequate application of rules would be a step toward a more
protective framework. This section will first establish why such a focus
may be the best way to protect people who suffer from mental illness from
the death penalty and then will argue that people who suffer from mental
illness should have additional due process protection. Finally, this section
proposes specific improvements to due process protections and fair
resolution.
Because there is little likelihood that the death penalty will be abolished
in the immediate future in the United States, improving the effectiveness of
due process protections is likely the best way to protect people who suffer
from mental illness from the death penalty. The death penalty will unlikely
be abolished due to the high legal standard and the climate of the current
Supreme Court—while having stayed some executions, it is not keen on
improving existing guarantees.111
Most challenges to the death penalty are based on categorical approaches
and arise under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment. For a claim to be successful, excessive punishment must be
established either under the criterion existing at the time the Bill of Rights
was adopted or against the evolving standard of decency.112 A broad
exemption for people who suffer from mental illness would not survive
either of these standards. Although lunatics—as the “insane” were called at
the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights—are excluded from the death
penalty, the criterion used then was a time-framed analysis, which leads to
the above-mentioned problem of underinclusiveness.113 The evolving
standard of decency test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court is based in part
on the number of states that have abolished the death penalty. So far only
one state, Connecticut, has statutes that prohibit the execution of people
who suffer from mental illness at the time of the commission of the
crime.114 Only one other state, New Jersey, has repealed the death penalty
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after the 1976 Supreme Court decision in Gregg v. Georgia.115 And only
one other state, Indiana, seems keen to start debates on a similar
proposition.116 Thus, because so few states have banned the death penalty,
a claim that the practice—applied to people who suffer from mental
illness—offends the U.S. evolving standard of decency would not be
successful.
As to the current Supreme Court, there is reason to believe that it is not
open to expanding the category of insanity. According to the Associated
Press, “[u]ntil now, the high court has avoided challenges to insanity
defense laws”117 and “seem[s] uninterested . . . in broadly addressing the
constitutional rights of psychotic criminal defendants whose lawyers want
them sentenced to psychiatric facilities instead of prisons.”118 In a recent
case, Panetti v. Quaterman, the Supreme Court was unwilling to diminish
the reach of the death penalty.119 In that case, the Court refused to establish
new standards for the competency of people to be executed; instead, it
referred the case back to the federal district court, holding that the existing
standards had not been met.120 This likely means that present attempts to
advance a categorical ban for people suffering from mental illness would be
unsuccessful.
To ensure effective protection, special standards of due process would
have to be established specifically for people who suffer from mental
illness. Establishing special standards might be opposed based on the belief
that creating new rights for a specific population would be a violation of
equality. This perception, however, is misplaced. The concept of equality
encompasses both formal equality (i.e., treating all people equally) and
substantive equality (taking differences into consideration as necessary for
actual protection).121 As the above-mentioned problems show, existing
standards are not enough; thus, these special protections would simply
afford people who suffer from mental illness the same level of protections
as others. This claim could be read as a reversal from the idea of different
but equal—which has served as a basis for ensuring human rights to
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disabled people—to a formula of equal but different, whereby people who
suffer from mental illness are entitled to the same human rights as other
individuals (with some adaptation of the guarantees to effectuate them) in
light of their specific needs and particularities.122
Another problem with current fair trial and due process protections is that
they suffer from arbitrariness, as shown by the cases included in the AI
report.123 If there is arbitrariness, the death penalty cannot be imposed;
Article 6 of the ICCPR states, among other things, that “no one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life.”124 According to the UN Principles on the
Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and
Summary Executions,125 if the perception of arbitrariness appears, then the
state has to try to avoid arbitrary executions by judicial or other means.126
The approach of having special due process protections in order to
protect vulnerable people is supported by several Supreme Court decisions
stating that due process does not have a single formula and can be
“flexibilized” in different categories.127 Also, as the right to due process is
protected by the U.S. Constitution,128 if the strengthened procedural
guarantees were established by a Supreme Court decision, they would
enhance uniformity of capital punishment decisions and further advance
limitations on the practice. This conclusion is supported by a recent
practice in China, whose high court has assumed a more centralized role by
reviewing all capital punishment cases, which has resulted in a decrease in
death penalty verdicts.129
The idea proposed by this article is to improve existing standards in the
regular criminal procedure rather than create a new system to deal with
people who suffer from mental illness. A new system—a mental health
court model—is inconsistent with the broader arguments being made here
because it preconditions jurisdiction of the court on a guilty plea, which is
contrary to the idea that a person who suffers from mental illness has
diminished capacity and is therefore not guilty of criminal acts. Further,
having a separate system may lead to increased stigma and prejudice,
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further eroding the human rights of people who suffer from mental
illness.130
Thus, having a special set of standards of fair trial and due process to
accommodate the needs of people who suffer from mental illness would not
be a violation of the principle of equality. In addition, the creation of these
special standards would not only benefit people who suffer from mental
illness but also quell fears among those who worry that a defendant could
fake the existence of a mental illness in order to escape the death penalty—a
common fear among those who defend the death penalty in general.131
Given that people who suffer from mental illness are currently subject to
the death penalty and likely will be for the foreseeable future, improving
due process protections and fair resolution is critical. Some procedural
protections for people who suffer from mental illness exist, but they could
be improved at the following three stages: trial, sentencing, and execution.
Past and continuing executions of people with clear mental disorders132
demonstrate that the existence of a general exemption is not a guarantee
against inadequate application of that exemption. Problems have occurred
when applying the rule in cases that have led to the conviction and
execution of people that clearly met the definition of “insane.”
Apart from the issue of competency, defendants with mental illness
contribute to a range of procedural problems related to their illness, such as
not allowing their attorneys to present facts related to the existence of the
illness, not cooperating with their attorneys, and not being willing to
participate in an appeal. In addition, defendants with mental illness are
sometimes willing to be executed,133 which jeopardizes the application of
safeguards because arguments for diminished capacity and for
incompetence then cannot be made. One possible solution that would
address many of these concerns is to allow another person to act in the best
interests of the defendant.
This solution is stated in the ABA
134
recommendation and seems to improve the treatment of people who
suffer from mental illness. Some advocates of mental health rights,
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however, criticize this proposal and, instead, maintain that the goal in
dealing with mental disorders is autonomy for those who suffer from mental
disorders.135
Juries pose additional problems—specifically, the existence of
prejudice136 and lack of understanding of the real impact of mental illnesses
on behavior.137 First, as much as 75 percent of the public view people with
mental illness as violent.138 Given that the perception of danger plays a role
in “convincing” jurors of defendants’ guilt in criminal proceedings, this
perception, coupled with fear and misunderstanding, can lead to guilty
verdicts. Second, jury decisions are often impacted by jury members’
perceptions as to whether and to what degree the defendants feel remorse.139
This is problematic for defendants that suffer from mental illness, as they
may be unable to show remorse as a result of their disease because they
may lack the cognitive skills to understand their actions and to separate
right from wrong.140
Additionally, jurors often mistakenly believe that the alternative to a
death sentence is liberty rather than life imprisonment or commitment to a
psychiatric institution. There is still pervasive stigma and fear of people
who suffer from mental illness due to lack of knowledge about various
disorders; this stigma and fear may influence jurors to believe that the
behavior of the defendant will lead to future violent behavior.141 Ensuring
that society will not be at risk if the death penalty is not applied—for the
defendant will not be set free, but rather sent to a treatment facility—can
substantially change the mood of the jurors to reject the death penalty and
sentence a person to life.
Moreover, both due process and fair trial are long-established civil and
political rights dating back to the ratification of the Fifth Amendment. If
more concern for the proper application of due process protections and fair
trial were present, more people who suffer from mental illness would be
protected from the death penalty. This is the idea expressed, for instance, in
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the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, which also focuses on the right to a fair trial.142
In light of the above, adding attention to the procedural aspects of
criminal cases should be a part of the effort to limit the imposition of the
death penalty to people who suffer from mental illness. Adequate
procedural protections would, at a minimum, involve a panel of doctors to
evaluate the disease (to avoid personal bias and prejudice and guarantee an
opinion less fallible than the one obtained by relying on just one expert).
The evaluation should: (1) involve meeting not only the defendant but also
people connected to him or her (to gather more information and also
because the mere existence of the disease sometimes prevents the defendant
from being able or willing to assist in his or her own evaluation); (2) be a
product of more than one interview with the defendant (so to be true to the
process-like features of diagnosis and of the disease); (3) not be the result of
just a standard test but rather a combination of personal interviews,
interviews with relatives or members of the personal circle, and tests
(because experts seem to diverge on which of these strategies is the best
one); and (4) should not be focused only on pretrial, in-trial, and
preexecution procedures (to avoid the above-mentioned underinclusiveness
of time-framed diagnosis), and a follow-up evaluation. The panel should be
composed of: (1) both men and women with diverse ethnic backgrounds
(because diagnoses are culturally influenced, it is important to have a more
comprehensive panel in order to minimize the possibility of prejudices
interfering with the result), and (2) either disinterested doctors or doctors
chosen by both the defendant and the state (to avoid biased opinions
depending on who hired the doctor and also due to the burden-sharing
notion mentioned above). Adequate procedural protections should also
include a mandatory psychiatric evaluation in all capital cases (due to the
fact that the disease may be of such a type that the defendant or his or her
defense counsel do not recognize the fact that he or she is sick, or because
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lack of money is often an obstacle in assessing the mental health of a
defendant).
B. Improving Access to Medical Care
A second avenue for improving protection of people who suffer from
mental illness is improvement of access to medical care. Some studies
show that most people who suffer from a mental disorder143 in general, and
those who suffer from a mental illness and committed a crime in particular,
lacked adequate medical care in the past.144 Other studies have found
evidence of the even more perverse situation where people who suffer from
mental illness commit crimes as a cry for help but do not receive medical
care.145 In addition, many incarcerated people who suffer from mental
illness do not receive adequate medical treatment.146
It is harmful for society as a whole to criminalize being sick,147 especially
given the effectiveness of current treatment. According to the American
Psychiatric Association, the success rate for treatment of mental illnesses is
high: for major depression, 65 percent; for schizophrenia, 60 percent; for
obsessive-compulsive disorder, 60 percent; for bipolar disorder, 80 percent;
and for panic disorder, 80 percent.148 With rates this high, focusing on
treatment may be an effective strategy for achieving in practice an
exemption from the death penalty for people who suffer from mental
illness, especially given that the right to enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health has already been recognized in
international law.149
Focusing on access to medical care to protect people who suffer from,
mental illness from the death penalty will require advocating for economic
and social rights and will present new challenges. One of the problems that
may arise is the cost of providing adequate medical care; however, it is
extremely expensive to keep people in prison and to execute them, so the
question seems to be more a choice of how to use resources. In any event,
if the goal is to protect people who suffer from mental illness from capital
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punishment, adequate medical care would curtail the death penalty and
dedicate resources to treating the illness.

V. CONCLUSION
Three changes would ensure better protection from the death penalty for
people who suffer from mental illness. First, because mental illness is a
medical condition, an interdisciplinary approach would ensure that the
needs of people who suffer from these diseases are effectively addressed.
Second, procedural guarantees should be enhanced in order to better address
the needs of people who suffer from mental illness in capital punishment
cases. Finally, improving access to medical care would provide people who
suffer from mental illness needed treatment and help prevent
criminalization due to mental illness.
This article demonstrates that no single solution will be able to strike the
required balance in protecting people who suffer from mental illness within
systems that maintain the death penalty. However, with creative and
interdisciplinary initiatives, it is possible to reconcile the goals of human
rights, criminal law, and psychiatry to achieve a system that protects people
who suffer from mental illness from the death penalty.
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